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WHAT IMPACT WILL THE REVISED TRADE UNION 
LAW OF CHINA HAVE ON FOREIGN BUSINESS? 
Zana Z. Bugaighis† 
Abstract:  Cheap labor.  Minimal regulations.  Bribable officials.  Foreign 
corporations attracted to China because of its low cost of business have avoided the 
unionization desired by the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”) despite China’s history of 
weak trade union laws and inconsistent enforcement of union mandates.  However, recent 
concerns of social unrest have forced the CCP to consider reforming the political tools 
used to control Chinese society.  The CCP wants to create social stability, avoid 
independent unionization, and prevent the westernization of China.  Foreign Investment 
Enterprises (“FIEs”) present new challenges for labor market regulation in China with 
their large number of non-unionized workers revolting at poor working conditions, as 
well as FIEs’ importation of western values.  The Trade Union Law amendment of 2001 
affords the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”) more avenues of 
enforcement through which to force FIEs to unionize and obliges the ACFTU to become 
a greater presence in private enterprises—especially FIEs.  Moreover, the proposed 
(draft) Labor Contract Law provides the ACFTU with greater oversight power through 
which to monitor the actions of FIEs and Chinese workers.   
The new regulatory environment providing greater legal authority to the ACFTU 
does not need to cause foreign enterprises to withdraw from China out of fear of 
increased unionization or further legislation.  The ACFTU and CCP value harmonious 
relationships over striking workers and value foreign business.  Moreover, unionization 
will help consolidate workers under the socialist regime of the CCP, creating a more 
stable society and working environment in China, which ultimately will benefit FIEs.  
China’s battle with FIEs to increase unionization is being waged by the CCP in order to 
enable the CCP to control the Chinese workforce and minimize outside influence, not in 
order to impose stricter conditions on foreign investment and take control over foreign 
business from enterprise management. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, China’s push for unionization of Foreign Investment 
Enterprises (“FIEs”) has become big news due to the country’s unionization 
of mega-store Wal-Mart’s Chinese workforce.1  Wal-Mart, staunchly anti-
union in the U.S., conceded suddenly to unionization requests by the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”)2 after a fight lasting more 
than two years.3  Most interesting in this story, and explored in this 
                                           
†  The author would like to thank the journal editorial staff.  
1
  Allen T. Cheng & Lee Spears, Wal-Mart Says It Will Let Its China Staff Unionize, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 9, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid= 
avP1E9.Hn.2U [hereinafter Walmart Says]. 
2  Id. 
3 
 Some Transnationals Go Seriously Against Trade Union Law, All China Workers Union, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Oct. 27, 2004, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200410/27/ 
eng20041027_161810.html [hereinafter Some Transnationals]. 
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comment, are the reasons why Wal-Mart allowed unionization in its Chinese 
stores and the motivations and legislation behind the Chinese Communist 
Party’s (“CCP”) and ACFTU’s push to compel Wal-Mart to unionize.  
For years, dwindling trade union membership4 has threatened the 
CCP’s control over increasingly agitated Chinese workers,5 allowing for an 
increasing number of strikes in China.6  FIEs’ increasing role in the Chinese 
economy, and their refusal to unionize, caused the CCP concern over 
possible westernization of the Chinese workforce inconsistent with socialist 
ideals.7  With large numbers of workers’ protests, widespread labor unrest, 
and increased independent organization, as well as a real fear of foreign 
influence, the CCP recognized the ability of the ACFTU to exert control 
over the troubled Chinese workforce.8   
The CCP is attempting to reassert control over Chinese workers by 
increasing unionization through a grant in the Trade Union Law9 of more 
enforcement and oversight power to the ACFTU and by creating further 
legislation10 in order to improve political relations with, and labor conditions 
for, workers.11  This move is meant to strengthen the power of the CCP 
through national unionization and to facilitate economic development 
through social stability in China’s new market economy.12  Spurred by the 
CCP, the ACFTU, China’s only legal trade union,13 is attempting to unionize 
the entire Chinese workforce, with a goal of unionizing eighty percent of 
FIEs by the end of 2007.14   
                                           
4
 IHLO.org, ACFTU and Trade Unions: Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, 
http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/000306.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2006) (“In the wake of the massive 
SOE restructuring, the ACFTU lost several million members and a significant proportion of its income.”).  
[hereinafter Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan]. 
5
  A Little Solidarity, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 23, 2006, at 43, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7949866 [hereinafter  A Little 
Solidarity]. 
6
  Jude Howell, New Democratic Trends in China? Reforming the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions at 8 nn.6-8 (Inst. of Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 263, 2006). 
7
  Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4. 
8
  See A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
9
  Trade Union Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, 
amended by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), translated in 
CHINA LAWS FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (CCH) 12-501 (2004) (P.R.C), available at 
http://www.acftu.org.cn/unionlaw.htm [hereinafter Trade Union Law]. 
10
   (draft) Labor Contract Law (2006) (P.R.C.) (as translated by Squire, Sanders & Dempsey LLP, 
Beijing Office) (on file with journal) [hereinafter (draft) Labor Contract Law].   
11
  See infra Part III-IV. 
12
  See infra Part IV.  
13  Constitution of Trade Unions (adopted by the Nat’l Cong. of the Chinese Trade Unions, Oct. 24, 
1998) translated at Constitution, http://www.acftu.org.cn/constitu.htm (P.R.C) (last visited Dec. 27, 2006).  
14 
 AMES GROSS & ANDREW CONNOR, CHINA HR AND RECRUITING ISSUES UPDATE - 2006 (2006), 
http://www.pacificbridge.com/publication.asp?id=77. 
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Although recent legislative changes and proposed legislation show 
that the CCP is giving the ACFTU oversight over enterprise management 
and worker relations, as well as more avenues through which to hold 
employers accountable,15 these changes do not need to cause FIEs to 
reconsider doing business in China.  In re-regulating the ACFTU, the CCP is 
providing trade unions with multiple masters16—stressing harmony, 
productivity, and encouraging foreign business.  Moreover, the CCP is 
aligning ACFTU leadership more firmly with its own, indicating that the 
needs of the CCP, and not those of the worker, will control the actions of the 
trade unions.17  Finally, the social stability sought by the CCP will benefit 
enterprise management by providing workers with greater allegiance to CCP 
mandates—creating fewer strikes and slow downs.18  
Part II of this comment looks at the political, economic, and market 
conditions in modern day China that have caused the CCP to push for 
greater unionization in the hope of attaining social stability.  Factors 
examined include China’s move from a planned economy to a socialist 
market economy, the effect of unemployment and dissatisfied workers, the 
rise of FIEs, the decrease in union membership, and the effect of lost union 
dues on the ACFTU and CCP.  Part III discusses what the recent legislative 
changes made by the CCP reveal about the party’s political and economic 
objectives for China and its workforce, as well as what consequences this 
might have on foreign business.  This section highlights the changes made in 
both the 199219 and 200120 amendments to the Trade Union Law of China 
and the proposed legislation of the (draft) Labor Contract Law,21 detailing 
the increased worker protection available and the barriers that make it 
difficult for the ACFTU to be an effective advocate for Chinese workers.  
Part IV looks at what role the CCP has provided for itself in its re-regulation 
of the ACFTU.  Finally, Part V proposes that FIEs do not need to look 
unfavorably on this new regulatory environment and can continue to engage 
in profitable business in China.   
                                           
15
  See infra Part III. 
16
  See infra Part III. 
17
   See infra Part IV-V. 
18
  See infra Part IV-V. 
19
  Trade Union Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 3, 1992, 
effective Apr. 3, 1992), translated in LAWS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 811 (Chinese English ed. 
v.1 2000) (P.R.C) [hereinafter Trade Union Law 1992].   
20
  Trade Union Law, supra note 9. 
21
  (draft) Labor Contract Law, supra note 10. 
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II. GOVERNMENT RE-REGULATION OF TRADE UNIONS WAS PROMPTED BY 
THE CCP’S LOSS OF CONTROL OVER THE CHINESE WORKFORCE DUE TO 
LOW LEVELS OF UNIONIZATION 
Massive unemployment22 and few worker protections led to worker 
strikes and protests that compelled the CCP to provide more power to the 
ACFTU in order to guarantee implementation of its policies and regain 
control over the Chinese workforce.23  The shift from a planned economy to 
a socialist market economy in China24 caused many State-Owned 
Enterprises (“SOEs”) to close, resulting in the loss of jobs and benefits for 
many state-employed workers.25  As unemployment soared and working 
conditions worsened, increasing worker strikes and attempts at independent 
unionization threatened social stability in China.26  With union membership 
on the decline due to the loss of SOE union members and the refusal of 
growing FIEs to allow Chinese workers to unionize, the CCP lost 
committees in enterprises, resulting in less control over Chinese workers.27  
The CCP also subsequently lost funding formerly provided by union dues.28  
In addition, FIEs’ increasing role in the Chinese economy created concerns 
of westernization,29 prompting the CCP to rely more on the ACFTU to 
deliver its socialist message to Chinese workers.30  
A. The CCP Is Threatened by Dwindling Union Membership and a Loss 
of Control over Increasingly Agitated Workers 
China, as a socialist state, has a long history of trade unionism 
centralized in the ACFTU.31  All unions in China must be affiliated with the 
ACFTU,32 which is controlled by the CCP.33  The ACFTU officially dates 
                                           
22 
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 67 (John Harper Publ’g 6th ed. 2005) [hereinafter TRADE UNIONS 
OF THE WORLD 6th].  
23
  Id.; A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
24
  Amendment Empowers China’s Trade Unions Greater Role in Protecting Members’ Rights, 
PEOPLE’S DAILY, Sep. 26, 2003, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/26/ 
eng20030926_125013.shtml [hereinafter Amendment Empowers].  
25
  David Barboza, China Drafts Law to Boost Unions and End Labor Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2006, at A1.   
26
  Id. 
27
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
28
  Id. 
29
  Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4. 
30
  See TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 67. 
31
  MARY ELIZABETH GALLAGHER, CONTAGIOUS CAPITALISM: GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF 
LABOR IN CHINA 82 (2005).  Though it is extremely important to the view the changing role of the trade 
unions in context, the history of the movement has been detailed extensively elsewhere and only 
background essential to understanding this comment is noted here.  
32
  Trade Union Law, supra note 9,  art. 10. 
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back to May 1, 1925,34  and operates under the principle of “democratic 
centralism,” with each union branch deferring to higher levels in the union 
hierarchy.35  The ACFTU has a membership of 134 million, with thirty-one 
trade union federations of provinces, autonomous regions, and 
municipalities “directly under the Central Government” and ten industrial 
unions that are nationwide.36  The highest level of trade union authority is 
the National Congress of Trade Unions, which meets every five years.37  
When the Congress is not in session, the Executive Committee of 267 
members is the highest level of union authority.38  When the Executive 
Committee is not in session, the Presidium of thirty-nine members holds the 
highest level of power.39  Lastly, the Secretariat, consisting of a first 
secretary and members elected from the members of the Presidium, takes 
care of routine work for the ACFTU.40  Although the ACFTU is defined as 
independent,41 the ACFTU governing members are closely aligned with the 
CCP.42  Unions are financed by membership dues that include a mandatory 
contribution fee of two percent of the monthly payroll of all employees and 
staff members paid by the unionized enterprises, dues from trade union 
members’ own paychecks, and subsidies provided by the CCP.43   
In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese workers under China’s “iron rice 
bowl” system were provided jobs by local labor bureaus44 and were 
furnished housing and health coverage by the Chinese government or 
SOEs.45  During this time, trade unions did not act on behalf of Chinese 
workers.46  Instead, at their best, the unions acted as mediators between 
workers and management.47  Labor turnover was minimal due to the labor 
protections provided by the CCP.48  SOEs and collective enterprises 
participated as “mini welfare states.” with trade unions influencing the 
                                                                                                                              
33
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5; NG SEK HONG & MALCOLM WARNER, CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS 
AND MANAGEMENT 86 (1998). 
34 
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 67.  
35
  Trade Union Law, supra note 9, arts. 9, 11.  
36
  ACFTU.org, About ACFTU, http://www.acftu.org.cn/about.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). 
37








 Trade Union Law, supra note 9, art. 4. 
42
  See TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 69. 
43
  Trade Union Law, supra note 9, art. 42. 
44 
 NG SEK HONG & MALCOLM WARNER, CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT 80-81 (1998). 
45 
 Barboza, supra note 25. 
46
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
47
  Id. 
48
  Daniel Z. Ding et al., The Impact of Economic Reform on the Role of Trade Unions in Chinese 
Enterprises,  13:3 INT. J.  HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 431, 432 (2002). 
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distribution of social services that the enterprises provided to workers.49  
Nearly all workers in SOEs continue to be trade union members.50   
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy in 
the 1970s led to changes in industrial relations bringing about rapid 
development of the private sector51 and the eventual closure of a large 
number of SOEs.52  This move also meant an end to China’s lifelong 
employment system, resulting in “mass layoffs, unemployment, huge gaps in 
income and pervasive labor abuse.”53  Many rural laborers traveled to 
industrialized areas54 where China’s emphasis on free markets encouraged 
workers to labor for low and often unpaid wages.55  Foreign investment rose 
in tandem with these increasing labor abuses.56   
Closures of SOEs, due to unprofitability and China’s massive 
unemployment problem coupled with social unrest, forced the CCP to re-
examine the role of the ACFTU in creating job security and worker 
confidence.57  A 1993 survey of SOE workers revealed that 46.5 percent 
believed that “the union doesn’t play a large role.”58  Moreover, workers 
reported no confidence in trade unions, as they were considered “part of the 
administration.”59   
In the 1990s, SOEs employed over 110 million workers (with almost 
complete unionization) and were “heavily subsidized, overmanned and often 
loss-making,”60 which soon lead to forced closures and subsequent mass 
unemployment.61  The Tiananmen Square protest in June 1989 quelled the 
rising independent trade movement that attempted to re-establish protections 
for workers.62  It also forced the CCP to re-examine the ACFTU and trade 
unions’ roles in maintaining social stability.63  The process of eliminating 
                                           
49
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 68. 
50
 Id. at 69. 
51
 Amendment Empowers, supra note 24. 
52
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 67. 
53
 Barboza, supra note 25.  
54
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 67. 
55
 IHLO.org, Workers: On Labour Shortages in China, http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/W/004005.html 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2006). 
56
 See Barboza, supra note 25. 
57
 Howell, supra note 6, at 8 nn.6-8. 
58
 GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 188 n.70 (citing “A Report on the Status of the National Working 
Class,” (guanyu quanguo gongren jieji duiwu zhuangkuang de diaocha baogao) Trade Union Work Report 
(gonghui gongzuo tongxun) 31 (1993)). 
59
 Id.  
60
 NG SEK HONG & MALCOLM WARNER, CHINA’S TRADE UNIONS AND MANAGEMENT 80 (1998). 
61
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 6th, supra note 22, at 67. 
62
 Howell, supra note 62, at 10. 
63
 1 INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS 31-21 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby 
eds., 2d ed. 2003 & Supp. 2005)[hereinafter Keller & Darby]. 
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inefficient and unprofitable SOEs was slowed in China due to the impact 
these closures had on social welfare, unemployment, and consequent social 
instability.64  Most SOEs in China have been, or are now becoming, 
privatized, and foreign investment in SOEs is encouraged in order to 
increase profitability and limit closures.65  Today in China there are between 
80 and 120 million unemployed workers, including those formerly employed 
by SOEs.66   
Numerous violations of workers’ rights and the growing number of 
strikes67 negatively impacted social stability and economic development in 
China,68 making the CCP fear loss of control over the Chinese workforce 
and loss of foreign investment.69  The CCP resolved to mute any attempts at 
independent unionization and to regain control of social stability through 
increased unionization via the unitary operation of ACFTU.70   
B. FIEs’ Increasing Role in the Chinese Economy Creates Concerns of 
Westernization for the CCP as Well as a Loss of Financing for the 
CCP and ACFTU Through Lost Union Dues  
With union membership down, the CCP’s control over workers was 
weakened, permitting the infiltration of western values71 and creating 
instability that had the potential to affect foreign investment.72  As the 
number of SOEs declined, the private sector and FIEs contributed to the 
country’s success73 without much unionization74; indeed, FIEs often refused 
to permit unionization at all.75  FIEs’ refusal to sanction unions and pay the 
two percent wage contribution to the ACFTU weakened the latter’s political 
and financial strength.76  By 1999, union membership fell to 87 million, 
down from 104 million in 1995, leaving the CCP anxious for change.77   
                                           
64
  Id. 
65
  Id.  
66
  Id.  
67
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
68
  Amendment Empowers, supra note 24. 
69 
 Howell, supra note 62, at 24.  
70 
 IHLO.org, ICFTU comments on the First Report submitted by the People’s Republic of China on 
its implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, § 1.1.3, 
http://www.ihlo.org/IS/ICFTU_comments_ICESR_2005.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2006). 
71
 Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4. 
72
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
73 
 Amendment Empowers, supra note 24. 
74
  GALLAGHER, supra note 31, at 85 (Before 1994, unionization at foreign firms was less than ten 
percent despite regulations that called for their unionization).   
75 
 Howell, supra note 62, at 10. 
76
  Id. 
77
  A Little Solidarity, supra note 5. 
412 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 2 
 
 
With the number of workers employed in FIEs on the rise,78 the CCP 
placed its goal of creating a unionized socialist workforce over its fear of 
losing foreign business—despite the evident importance of foreign business 
in China’s economy.  From January to December 2006, imports and exports 
of foreign-invested enterprises totaled US $1036.451 billion, accounting for 
58.18 percent of China’s total imports and exports.79  In 2000, FIEs 
employed just over three million workers.80  By March of 2006, the ACFTU 
stated that twenty million Chinese workers were employed in FIEs and that 
this number was growing quickly.81  That month the ACFTU launched a 
campaign to set up trade union branches in FIEs carrying out business in 
China.82  In some instances, the ACFTU acted by forcing the establishment 
of basic level unions in FIEs,83 an action that prior to the 2001 amendment 
was a fundamental violation of the trade union law.84  This forced 
establishment was due in part to FIEs’ unwillingness to unionize, and 
partially to a lack of worker interest in establishing unions themselves.85  
However, in order for the ACFTU to reach its goal of unionization in the 
face of these obstacles, the CCP has been uncharacteristically willing to 
overtly interfere in order to encourage unionization.86  At the Fourteenth 
National Congress of the ACFTU, ACFTU Vice Chairman Zhang Junjiu 
stated, “the Western hostile forces have never halted in Westernizing and 
dividing us.  They attempted to make use of the conflicts between social 
interests and labor relations, to damage the unity between working class and 
trade union.”87   The ACFTU’s agenda to unionize more workers, especially 
                                           
78
  Getting Unions into Foreign Enterprises, ACFTU BULL., No. 3, 2006, 
http://www.acftu.org.cn/0603.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006). 
79
  Import & Export Statistics by FIEs from Jan. to Dec. 2006, http://www.fdi.gov.cn/ (follow 
“Import & Export Statistics by FIEs from Jan to Dec 2006” hyperlink) (last visited December 26, 2006).  
80
  David Metcalf & Jianwei Li, Chinese Unions: Nugatory or Transforming? An Alice Analysis 13 
tbl.4 (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion Paper No. 708, 2005). 
81 
 Getting Unions into Foreign Enterprises, ACFTU BULL., No. 3, 2006, 
http://www.acftu.org.cn/0603.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006); see also Employment Situation, ACFTU 
BULL., No. 2, 2006, http://www.acftu.org.cn/0602.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006) (China’s total employed 
workforce reached 758 million by the end of 2005).  
82 
 CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, at 6 (2006), 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/annualRpt06/CECCannRpt2006.pdf [hereinafter 
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA]. 
83
  Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4. 
84 
 Trade Union Law, supra note 9, art. 2 (Trade unions are mass organizations of the working class 
formed by the workers and staff members on a voluntary basis). 
85
  Id. 
86 
 See infra Part V.B.1. 
87
  Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4. 
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those in FIEs, is motivated by this presumption and by the hope that a 
socialist message will create a more stable workforce.88  
III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE CHANGES SHOW THAT THE CCP INTENDED THE 
TRADE UNION LAW AND DRAFT LABOR CONTRACT LAW TO PROVIDE 
MORE PROTECTIONS TO WORKERS WITHOUT UNDULY RESTRICTING 
BUSINESS 
The Trade Union Law amendment and the (draft) Labor Contract Law 
grant more enforcement and oversight power to the ACFTU over all 
enterprises in China without taking too much control over business from 
enterprise management.89  The Trade Union law provides competing masters 
for the ACFTU—requiring trade unions to protect workers’ rights while 
remaining loyal to the CCP’s objectives and encouraging business.90  
Although trade unions are granted more influence over worker disputes, and 
greater authority with which to handle these claims, the ACFTU is not meant 
to be antagonistic towards enterprise management.91  Instead, the CCP 
values harmonious relations between workers and enterprise in order to 
further the CCP objectives of social stability and a healthy economy.92  
A. The 1992 Amendment to the Chinese Trade Union Law Laid the 
Foundation for Change Actualized in the 2001 Amendment 
In 1992, a new Trade Union Law93 replaced the antiquated Trade 
Union Law of 1950.94  The 1992 Trade Union Law defined ACFTU’s role as 
an “instrument of official policy” and confirmed the ACFTU’s presence as 
the sole trade union organization of China.95  This 1992 amendment was the 
beginning of the CCP’s push to unionize FIEs through formal legal 
                                           
88
 Some Thoughts on the 2006 ACFTU Year Plan, supra note 4 (“The [ACFTU’s] work-plan for 
2006 contains four main sections[:] [t]o improve the quality of the workforce[,] [t]o build a better system 
under the ACFTU to protect workers’ rights[,] [t]o enhance union-organizing in private enterprises[, and] 
[t]o promote the rights of migrant workers.”).  
89
 See infra Part III.A-D. 
90
 See infra Part III-IV. 
91
 See infra Part III A-D. 
92
 ACFTU Seeks Harmony in Enterprises, ACFTU BULL., No. 4, 2006,  
http://www.acftu.org.cn/0604.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2006); ACFTU.org, Resolution on Taking the 
Development Road of Socialist Trade Union with Chinese Characteristics (July 5, 2005),  
http://www.acftu.org.cn/resolution.htm. 
93
 Trade Union Law 1992, supra note 19. 
94
 The Trade Union Law (promulgated by the Cent. People’s Gov’t, June 29, 1950, effective June 
29, 1950), translated in STATUTES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (1987) 
(compiled by the Institute of Chinese Law) (P.R.C). 
95
 TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 67 (John Harper Publ’g 5th ed. 2001) [hereinafter TRADE UNIONS 
OF THE WORLD 5th]. 
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measures.  The 1992 amendment lowered the threshold number of workers 
requesting unionization that was required in order to unionize an enterprise 
from two hundred to twenty-five, giving the ACFTU access to more sectors 
of the workforce.96  In 1991, only twenty percent of workers in FIEs were 
unionized compared to the ninety percent of workers unionized in SOEs.97  
In February 1994, the ACFTU campaigned to raise membership, 
successfully unionizing thirty-one percent of workers in FIEs and twelve 
percent in privately owned domestic enterprises by the end of the 1990s.98   
B. Changes in the 2001 Amendment Create More Oversight and 
Enforcement Power for the ACFTU in Order to Allow the CCP More 
Control Over the Chinese Workforce 
The major changes in the 2001 amendment to the Trade Union Law 
show that the motivation behind the amendment came from a desire for trade 
unions to play a more active role in helping the CCP control workers and 
maintain social stability.99  The amendment increased ACFTU oversight of 
enterprise management and created more avenues by which to legally pursue 
employers involved in labor abuses and obstructing unionization.100  After 
enacting the 2001 Trade Union Law amendment, the ACFTU increased trade 
union membership to 134 million in 2002, compared with 91.31 million in 
1997.101  Local-level grassroots union organizations also gained members, 
reaching 1,713,000 members in 2002, compared with just 510,000 five years 
before.102   
1. The 2001 Trade Union Law Amendment Does Not Provide Workers 
the Right to Strike and Requires Unions to Encourage and Protect 
Business 
The current Trade Union Law, last amended in 2001, does not 
expressly allow worker strikes, and requires the minimization of any 
interruption in production.103  FIEs should not prematurely worry that trade 
unions will create unnecessary hurdles to management negotiations with 
                                           
96
 Trade Union Law 1992, supra note 19, art. 12; TRADE UNIONS OF THE WORLD 5th, supra note 95, 
at 65. 
97




 See infra Part III.B-IV. 
100
 See infra Part III.B-III.D. 
101





 Trade Union Law, supra note 9, art. 27. 
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workers as the Trade Union Law also requires the ACFTU to work with 
enterprise management to encourage business.104   
The 1982 PRC Constitution, currently in force, does not expressly 
include the right to strike,105 and this right was not included in the Trade 
Union Law amendment in 2001.106  Instead, a union has the duty to protect 
the work unit’s normal production and work order.107  One provision of the 
Trade Union Law makes it possible for employees to take concerted action 
in the form of a stoppage or slowdown of work in order to pressure the 
enterprise to accept reasonable demands.108  Trade unions are required to 
represent workers with regard to workers’ reasonable demands toward the 
working enterprise.109  The enterprise then shall try to accept the employees’ 
demands if they are reasonable.110  Noting that what constitutes a reasonable 
demand is unclear,111 William L. Keller and Timothy J. Darby also observe 
that it seems legal for employers to terminate striking employees for 
“‘engaging in disturbances which disrupt production, work or public order’ 
without good cause (such as opposition to dangerous working conditions)” 
even with trade union assistance.112  These provisions, while offering some 
option of concerted action, seem to negate any real protection by allowing 
enterprises to act in a retaliatory manner.  In fact, despite the requirement 
that trade unions present worker demands, Article 27 does not expressly 
sanction slowdowns or stoppages.113  Instead, the article provides trade 
unions with a role in assisting enterprises in restoring production as soon as 
possible should such a situation occur.114  
2. The Trade Union Law Amendment Does Not Clarify the ACFTU’s 
Conflicting Objectives to Protect Workers’ Rights While Encouraging 
Business and Remaining Loyal to the CCP and the PRC as a Whole 
The current Trade Union Law attempts to more adequately address the 
needs of workers than previous versions of the law, but falls short of 
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requiring unions to represent only the interests of workers.115  The 2001 
amendment to the Trade Union Law states, “the basic duties and functions of 
trade unions are to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of 
workers.”116  Article 2 also adds a clause stating that the ACFTU represents 
the workers and staff members and guards their legitimate rights.117  Article 
6 of the Trade Union Law specifies methods such as equal consultation and 
collective contracts through which trade unions should achieve their goal of 
worker representation.118  Although the 2001 Amendment emphasizes the 
protection of Chinese workers, unions are also required to protect the 
interests of the CCP and enterprises.119  
Conflicting provisions in the Trade Union Law thwart any drastic 
change for workers or FIEs by requiring unions to protect business 
development and CCP objectives.  Trade unions are charged with taking 
“economic development as the central task,” necessitating compromising 
with foreign enterprises and responding to dictates by the CCP.120  The 
CCP’s policy of encouraging foreign business is evidenced in Article 37, 
which states that trade union committees in FIEs “shall, in accordance with 
the provisions of laws, organize the participation of the workers and staff 
members in democratic management of the enterprises and institutions by 
ways appropriate to the enterprises or institutions.”121  Also, in the same 
article that charges trade unions with promoting economic development, 
unions are newly required to “uphold the socialist road, the people’s 
democratic dictatorship, leadership by the Communist Party of China, and 
Marxist-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory.”122  
Recently, in April of 2006, the ACFTU mounted a nationwide movement to 
“foster harmony between labor and management.”123   These actions and 
provisions require the ACFTU’s adherence to the mandates of the CCP and 
the ACFTU’s encouragement of business in line with any economic policy 
so promulgated.   
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3. The 2001 Amendment Provides More Enforcement and Oversight 
Power to the ACFTU over All Enterprises in China 
The biggest change made by the 2001 amendment to the Trade Union 
Law was the addition of a final chapter entitled “Legal Responsibility,” 
which gives more enforcement and oversight power to trade unions should 
they choose to use it.124  In Article 19, instead of stating that a trade union 
has the right to “advance its opinion,”125 the Article now allows the trade 
union to “demand rectification” for acts in violation of Chinese law.126  This 
chapter also gives the ACFTU the power to bring a matter before the 
government or an action before a court if a worker’s rights are infringed 
upon.127  By creating multiple avenues of enforcement the CCP hopes to 
show enterprises that China is serious about unionization and encourage 
trade unions to more affectively advocate for Chinese workers.  
These provisions also come with a new twist: enterprises may not stop 
trade union officials from organizing their workers.  The Trade Union Law 
specifically states that “trade unions are mass organizations of the working 
class formed by the workers and staff members on a voluntary basis.”128  
Under the 2001 Revision, however, Article 10 was changed from “a basic-
level trade union committee may be set up in an enterprise” to “a basic-level 
trade union committee shall be set up in an enterprise.”129  Moreover, 
inserted in  Article 11 is the right of trade union organizations at higher 
levels to “dispatch their members to assist and guide the workers and staff 
members of enterprises to set up their trade unions, no units or individuals 
may obstruct the effort.”130  This mandate of non-interference in 
organization was also added to Article 3 of the Trade Union Law, signifying 
that the CCP intends to rely on the trade unions, not workers or FIEs, to 
initiate organization.131  In fact, the chapter also threatens criminal 
prosecution for those attempting to obstruct workers and staff members 
“from joining or organizing of trade unions in accordance with law or the 
effort made by trade unions at higher levels to assist and guide the workers 
and staff members in establishing trade unions,” if “such means as violence 
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and threat in obstruction” are used.132  All other obstructions are referred to 
“the administrative department of labor to make rectification.”133  Foreign 
enterprises resisting unionization will now find themselves violating the 
Trade Union Law and will find the ACFTU better equipped to enforce the 
law’s provisions that ban the obstruction of unions.  
To aid in the ACFTU’s attempt to add and retain trade union members, 
the CCP also created the right of the membership of a dissolved trade union 
to be retained by the ACFTU.134  Further, organizations or individuals cannot 
dissolve or merge trade unions at will.135  In this way enterprise closure does 
not cause a drastic decrease in trade union membership and a resulting loss 
of control by the CCP over workers.  Finally, the former language of the 
1992 Trade Union Law limited many articles to “trade unions in enterprises 
and institutions owned by the whole people or by the collective.”136  The 
new law makes no such distinction and expands its reach to all enterprises in 
China, not just SOEs.   
C. The 2003 Constitution of Trade Unions Supports the 2001 Trade 
Union Law Amendment’s Aim 
The Fourteenth National Congress of Trade Unions adopted an 
amendment to China’s 1998137 Constitution of Trade Unions in 2003.138  The 
amendment stipulated for the first time that protection of trade union 
members’ rights is the “most important task of trade unions,” whereas before 
such protection was considered a “non-binding social function.”139    
The changes made in the 2003 amendment to the Constitution of 
Trade Unions are similar to the changes in the 2001 amendment to the Trade 
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Union Law.140  The amendment to the Constitution of Trade Unions “was 
designed to make it possible for trade unions to play a greater role in 
improving industrial relations through protecting union members’ rights, 
thus facilitating social stability and economic development.”141  However, 
just like the 2001 amendment to the Trade Union Law, the Constitution 
seems to put more emphasis on improving industrial relations and economic 
development than protecting workers’ rights.142  The 2003 Amendment to the 
Trade Union Constitution further follows the 2001 amendment by requiring 
the ACFTU to protect union members’ rights without confrontation with 
employers.143  
Chinese trade unions benefit members by allowing workers to demand 
that trade unions give them protection “when their legitimate rights and 
interests are infringed upon.”144  However, the Constitution of Trade Unions 
also requires numerous duties of trade union members that are in line with 
the wishes of enterprise management and the CCP.  These include making 
“great efforts to fulfill production and work assignments,” abiding “by the 
Constitution and laws,” upholding “social morality and professional ethics,” 
and observing “labour discipline.” 145  Members must also “handle properly 
the relations among the interests of the state, the collective and individuals, 
and combat all conducts harmful to the interests of the state and society.”146  
The Chinese socialist method works to teach workers to “accept their role as 
loyal employees.”147  These goals provide trade union members with masters 
similar to those of the trade unions themselves and encourage members to 
put the needs of the PRC before their individual demands. 
The Constitution of Trade Unions requires trade unions to respect the 
development of business and to adhere to the values of the CCP.  Article 28 
states that “trade unions in foreign-funded enterprises and private enterprises 
shall . . . respect the legitimate rights and interests of the investors to seek 
for the development of the enterprises jointly.”148  The amended Constitution 
of Trade Unions also adopted the “Three Represents” as one of the ACFTU’s 
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guidelines in operation, aligning itself further with the Socialist state149 and 
away from the westernization feared by the CCP.150  The “Three Represents” 
is the CCP’s oath to always stand for “the development trend of China’s 
advanced social productive forces, the orientation of China’s advanced 
culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the 
people in China.”151   In this way, the interests of the CCP and ACFTU are 
furthered aligned in delivering a socialist message to the Chinese workforce.    
D. The Draft Labor Contract Law, in Its Current Form, Provides Needed 
Protections for Workers Without Unduly Restricting Enterprise 
Management 
China plans to adopt some form of the (draft) Labor Contract Law152 
of China, which would allow unions more say in FIE management153 and 
reinforce the power given to the ACFTU in the 2001 Trade Union Law 
amendment.154  In the (draft) Labor Contract Law the CCP grants the 
ACFTU the authority to assist employees in the signing and performance of 
labor contracts.155  Article 5 of the law requires that any regulations or 
policies made by an employer that are directly related to the vital interests of 
employees shall be adopted through the trade union, workers’ congress, or 
workers’ representative assembly or by equal negotiation.156  These 
additions, taken together with the admonition that any regulations directly 
related to the vital interests of employees adopted by employers unilaterally 
shall be null and void,157 have caused concern in FIEs.  The proposed law 
would also make laying off workers more difficult for companies, requiring 
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many decisions that affect Chinese workers to be first approved by trade 
unions.158   
Although the Labor Contract Law would affect all enterprises in 
China, it is targeted at FIEs and their suppliers.159  The law imposes 
burdensome fines on enterprises that violate the new law.160  “The principle 
is not to raise the labor standard dramatically,” stated Mr. Liu, the Shanghai 
lawyer who advised the government on the draft proposal, “but to raise the 
cost of violating the law.  The current labor law is a paper tiger and is a 
disadvantage to those who obey it.  If you don’t obey the law, you won’t be 
punished.”161   However, the current Trade Union Law already threatens 
criminal liability in some instances162 for violation of its provisions without 
any drastic deterrent effect.  Moreover, punishment for violations can only 
occur through enforcement of the law—enforcement that has in the past 
been weak at best.163  
With some of the most contested provisions of the (draft) Labor 
Contract Law already in force and the likelihood of strict enforcement still 
low, FIEs should not be concerned with the amount of oversight power given 
to trade unions.  Instead, increased yet modest protections should for now be 
looked on favorably as greater worker protection is likely to provide more 
content workers under the control of the CCP for FIEs.   
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IV. THE NEW REGULATORY SCHEME PROVIDES THE CCP WITH CLOSE 
CONTROL OVER THE ACFTU IN ORDER TO DELIVER THE CCP’S 
SOCIALIST MESSAGE TO CHINESE WORKERS 
The ACFTU is afforded power by the Trade Union Law to affect 
legislation contemplated by the CCP.164  Conversely, the CCP is given the 
power to report administrative measures and important work programs to the 
ACFTU and correspondingly to the working class.165  An addition to Article 
5 of the Trade Union Law in 2001 promulgated the rule that “trade unions 
shall assist the people’s governments in their work and safeguard the 
socialist State power under the people’s democratic dictatorship . . . .”166  In 
order to accomplish this goal, the ACFTU is tasked by the CCP with greater 
unionization of FIEs.167   
A. The CCP Hopes for Greater Control Through the ACFTU 
The history of the ACFTU has been one of almost complete alignment 
with the CCP’s changing political needs.168  The ACFTU was designed by 
the CCP as “a ‘transmission-belt’ between the [CCP] and the ‘masses’.”169  
As the majority of unionized SOEs were closed or privatized,170 and foreign 
enterprises grew, trade unions dropped from the workforce.171  This change 
deprived the CCP of “its own network of cells in workplaces”172 and 
deprived the CCP of a way to directly influence Chinese workers in the 
Party’s goal to create social stability, stop independent unionization, and 
prevent the westernization of China.173  Presently, the CCP is using the 
ACFTU as a political tool in order to become a greater presence in the 
growing force of foreign enterprise.174  The CCP’s grant of more 
enforcement and oversight power to the ACFTU will result in an increase in 
trade-union membership175 and, the CCP hopes, greater worker allegiance to 
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the CCP’s political and economic goals.176  With increased unionization and 
new party cells in FIEs, the CCP will be able to better spread its socialist 
message to workers.  
B. The Structure of the ACFTU Provides for Unity with the CCP  
In reformulating a role for the ACFTU, the CCP encourages trade 
unions to play a more active role in unionizing workers177 while also 
emphasizing the need for more CCP officers to play larger roles in the 
ACFTU.178  Although the ACFTU and its trade unions work 
“independently,”179 they must also work within the other limitations of the 
Trade Union Law, the Constitution of Trade Unions and the laws of China 
that are promulgated under the influence of, if not directly by, the CCP.180 
The ACFTU both represents the interests of workers to the CCP and, 
importantly, spreads CCP directives directly to Chinese workers.181  The 
ACFTU is provided with the power to give its opinions to government 
departments where its concerns are directly related to the immediate 
interests of workers and staff members.182  Conversely, Article 34 of the 
Trade Union Law states that the CCP may “inform the trade unions at the 
corresponding levels of their important work programs and administrative 
measures related to trade union work, analyze and settle the problems as 
reflected in the opinions and aspirations of the masses of the workers and 
staff members conveyed by trade unions.”183  In this way, the CCP is kept 
informed of the issues crucial to its workers and is provided the means to 
implement any social or political directives it deems necessary.   
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V. FIES CAN RESPOND TO THIS NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT BY 
WORKING WITH THE ACFTU AND CCP TO UNIONIZE IN CHINA 
WITHOUT FEAR OF A GREAT LOSS OF CONTROL OVER WORKERS 
FIEs do not need to back away from business in China solely out of 
premature fears due to increased unionization, legislation, or greater 
oversight of enterprise management by trade unions.  The CCP and ACFTU 
value harmonious relationships above striking workers and wish to create a 
stable society and economy through unionization and greater worker 
protection.184 
A. With the CCP Controlling the ACFTU and Chinese Workers, FIEs 
Should Feel Confident Business Will Not Be Harmed by Trade Unions 
Companies in China, especially FIEs,185 are concerned about the 
CCP’s grant of enforcement and oversight power to the ACFTU.186  The 
inability to lay off workers without first notifying trade unions,187 as 
proposed in the (draft) Labor Contract Law, has caused FIEs to warn that 
such burdensome requirements may reduce their current investments and 
growth in China, especially with energy and land costs on the rise.188  
However, what FIEs demand is unilateral authority to manage their 
companies, as opposed to negotiations in order to appease the demands of 
Chinese trade unions.189  The US-China Business Council, in response to the 
(draft) Labor Contract Law, wrote:  
It is not feasible to state that an employer’s regulations and 
policies shall be void if they are not adopted through 
negotiation with the trade union. . . .  Requiring the consent of 
the trade union before such changes can be made is overly 
burdensome and may prevent important company policies from 
being implemented in a timely manner. . . . [sic]  Final authority 
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and responsibility for company policies should rest in the hands 
of the employer.190 
FIEs concerned with the amount of oversight power given to trade unions by 
the (draft) Labor Contract Law should recognize the CCP’s new willingness 
to discuss legislation with foreign business as a sign that the CCP, and 
ACFTU, are willing to work with FIEs to do what is best for business.191  
Additionally, enterprise managers often serve as trade union officials, and 
the “labor union chairman often is a member of management,” making 
negotiations with trade unions entirely feasible for FIE managers.192   
FIEs should also acknowledge the stated purpose of Chinese unions, 
to uphold the values of the CCP and create worker harmony, outweighs the 
costs of worker protections to business, before condemning the law for its 
business interference.  Meanwhile, FIEs are fighting an image battle in the 
U.S. as labor rights activists denounce American corporations for their 
opposition to more rights for Chinese workers.193  For example, Global 
Labor Strategies issued a report detailing major U.S. companies’ opposition 
to minimum labor standards being offered by the CCP—standards still well 
below those available in America.194 
Even with increased power, Chinese trade unions will not have the 
ability to create great change for workers through strikes and worker 
representation, as do unions in western countries.195  The ACFTU is closely 
affiliated with the CCP and, as stated in the Economist, “[f]or all its Marxist 
pretensions, the [CCP] is still more interested in business than in the 
grievances of the proletariat.”196  The CCP is aware of FIEs’ contribution to 
China’s GDP and the importance of greater employment in the FIE sector to 
the economic development of the country.  The CCP also believes that social 
stability in China is necessary for its economic development.197  The passing 
of the (draft) Labor Contract Law highlights the Party’s mounting uneasiness 
over social unrest and its need to regain control and stability.198  FIEs should 
                                           
190 
 Id. at 5-6 (quoting Contract Comments, supra note 185, at 3-4). 
191 
 See infra Part V.B.1.  
192 
 Keller & Darby, supra note 63, at 31-22. 
193
  Barboza, supra note 25. 
194
  BEHIND THE GREAT WALL, supra note 189, at 2-5; Global Labor Strategies, A Response to the US-
China Business Council (Jan. 17, 2007), http://laborstrategies.blogs.com/global_labor_strategies/2007/01/ 
a_response_to_t.html#more. 
195




 See supra Parts II-IV. 
198
 Barboza, supra note 25. 
426 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 2 
 
 
not prematurely fear the role of the ACFTU’s trade unions and the CCP 
branch committees within their companies.199 
B. Better Control over Chinese Workers by the CCP, Aided by 
Unionization in FIEs, Will Help to Create a More Stable Chinese 
Society and Workforce 
The unionization of Wal-Mart in China demonstrates that FIEs can 
work with the ACFTU to unionize their workforce.  Chinese trade unions, as 
dictated by the CCP, strive to work with enterprise managers to establish 
control over Chinese workers as well as promote foreign business.200  
Greater worker protection and social stability in China will only better the 
environment for FIE growth.201   
1. China’s Unionization of Wal-Mart Confirms That the ACFTU Is 
Serious About Unionizing FIEs  
The Chinese unionization of Wal-Mart provides an example of a 
strictly anti-union FIE unionizing and cooperating with the CCP profitably.  
Wal-Mart’s initial resistance to trade unions in China greatly protracted the 
mega-store’s unionization.202  Despite Chinese efforts to unionize Wal-Mart 
for two years, and Wal-Mart’s establishment of thirty-five stores in 
seventeen Chinese cities, not a single Wal-Mart store in China had unionized 
by 2004.203  Chinese authorities accused Wal-Mart of obstructing 
unionization in violation204 of the Trade Union Law that had, since 2001, 
made such obstruction illegal.205  In Shanghai, local Chinese authorities 
reacted to Wal-Mart’s refusal to unionize by limiting the mega-store’s ability 
to invest in Shanghai without first assenting to unionization.206  In addition, 
China’s President Hu Jintao spurred the ACFTU to unionize Wal-Mart207 
through a written order in March demanding “a better job of building [CCP] 
organizations and trade unions in foreign-invested enterprises.”208  Hu’s 
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atypical involvement in working with FIEs likely helps explain the 
ACFTU’s ability to convince Wal-Mart to unionize in July 2006.209   
China’s success in unionizing Wal-Mart was also supported by the fact 
that the mega-store “isn’t afraid of strikes in China,” as stated by a company 
spokesman.210  The spokesman further stated, “China’s unions are different 
from unions elsewhere.  The goal of China’s unions is to build a harmonious 
society.”211  Wal-Mart believes, rightly, that the ACFTU is controlled by the 
CCP and will not do anything out of line with CCP objectives—objectives 
that still aim to encourage foreign investment, just not at the price of social 
instability.  Moreover, Wal-mart’s desire to acquire Trust-Mart, a Taiwanese-
owned supermarket chain and competitor (an acquisition that still required 
approval by Chinese authorities at the time of this writing), likely added 
further incentive for Wal-Mart to unionize.212   
In August 2006, the ACFTU stated that twenty-six percent of China’s 
150,000 FIEs were unionized213 and that the ACFTU aimed to unionize sixty 
percent of FIEs in China by the end of 2006.214  China’s success in 
unionizing Wal-Mart may compel other FIEs to follow suit and help with the 
ACFTU’s goal of increasing trade union members.215  Retailers such as Toys 
“R” Us, Home Depot, and Best Buy have announced plans to open outlets in 
China, proving that Wal-Mart unionization has not scared off all foreign 
business.216  Although Wal-Mart will now pay wage dues to the ACFTU,217 
Wal-Mart benefits from unionization through its probable acquisition of 
Trust-Mart218 and from the socialist message imparted on its workers. 
In July of 2006, the ACFTU held its Ninth Session of the Fourteenth 
Presidium in Beijing and passed the Regulation on Trade Union Work in 
Enterprise.219  The American Chamber of Commerce believes that the 
regulation is non-binding.220  However, early that same month Wang 
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Zhaoguo proposed an amendment to the Trade Union Law that would make 
it compulsory for foreign companies to unionize—marking an even greater 
push to force unionization in legislation and regulations.221  Even if the 
Regulation on Trade Union Work in Enterprise does not contain any similar 
mandates, and is, in fact, non-binding, the ACFTU’s active measures to 
unionize all FIEs make complying with the Trade Union Law, and 
cooperating with the CCP and ACFTU in unionization before legal action is 
taken, a smart and feasible move for FIEs. 
2. Minimal Increases in Worker Protections Will Help, Not Hinder, the 
Business Environment in China  
Through legislation, the ACFTU now has more power to defend 
workers rights.222  However, workers still do not have the right to strike,223 
and trade unions have a split allegiance between workers and economic 
development in line with the goals of the CCP.224  Although the (draft) Labor 
Contract Law appears to create a less autonomous environment for FIEs 
from the CCP and ACFTU, many of the law’s provisions are already in 
effect in the 2001 Trade Union Law amendment.225  Furthermore, the release 
of the law’s draft language shows the ACFTU’s willingness to include FIEs 
when discussing changes in Chinese business regulation.  
The ACFTU is a non-confrontational federation and desires to create 
harmonious relations with FIEs.226  Raising the standard of conditions in 
factories, and showing workers that the CCP is creating more worker 
protections, will reduce strikes and create social stability, in turn benefiting 
the Chinese economy and the business environment for FIEs.  Many 
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advantages to being in China remain, especially the opportunity to move into 
a growing market while sales are stagnant elsewhere.  Importantly, FIEs are 
not likely to have a choice in unionization in the future, as the CCP and 
ACFTU are unlikely to back away from their goal of unionizing FIEs.  With 
a reported goal of eighty percent unionization of FIES in 2007,227 the 
ACFTU is showing no signs of giving up on unionization any time soon.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
China’s transition from a planned economy to a market economy, and 
the country’s subsequent loss of benefits for many workers formerly 
employed by SOEs, as well as its growing unemployment problem and poor 
working conditions created agitated workers desperate for change.  The 
CCP, also anxious for change, was poised to use the ACFTU to regain 
control of the Chinese workforce, increase social stability, and promote 
economic development.  In order to combat many FIEs’ refusal to unionize 
and increase trade union membership, the CCP amended the Trade Union 
Law in 2001 to make obstructing unionization a crime and ensured 
compliance by giving the ACFTU more oversight over workers and greater 
enforcement power.  This amendment and the proposed (draft) Labor 
Contract Law, taken together with the push to establish more trade unions in 
FIEs, represent an attempt by the CCP to preserve its control over Chinese 
workers by augmenting the role of trade unions in managing labor relations. 
Although the 2001 Amendment provides more oversight of 
management, the amendment also gives the ACFTU competing masters and 
aligns trade union work with the goals of the CCP.  Provisions in the Trade 
Union Law allowing FIEs to integrate their own managers into their 
companies’ trade unions and encouraging fulfillment of production by 
workers evidence a strong desire by the CCP to work with FIE managers.  
Likewise, new legislation, such as the (draft) Labor Contract Law, should 
not be seen as an attack on foreign business.  Instead, laws providing needed 
protections for Chinese workers without unduly restricting business 
management should be recognized for their stated purpose of creating a 
stable business environment in China.  FIEs can work with the ACFTU and 
CCP to negotiate FIE a plan for unionization that will fulfill both of their 
goals and thereby improve the business environment in China. 
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